onsdag 13 november 2013

Theme #1 - Post-reflections

Since last week I haven’t had the opportunity to get a live lecture on the theme, which frankly is quite sad since I think the whole concept of sense-data was quite fascinating. Although it kind of boggles your mind when you try to think of it.


To get a better grip on sense-data I tried to sum up what my peers, as a whole, thought about this concept. I came to the conclusion that they all, in some sense (pun intended), got a pretty firm grip on its definition as well.


Although I feel somewhat enlighten by the way Russel makes you think in different ways, question an objects existence, or if you really ”know” something about it at all, It kind of makes me wonder "why still use a text which is over 100 years old"?. Aren’t there any philosophers left? I want to believe that there still are some critical thinkers out there who can question the very world we inhabit. But in modern society, I don’t find the act of ”questioning things” that normative anymore. Maybe it have gotten taboo?


I tried to find more recent sources of philosophers on this subject but have yet to find any that talks about the concept of sense-data and true knowledge from this milennia. But I believe that there are some interpretations that helped me get another point of view on what the term sense-data really, one of them being from a paper named ”Sense-data” written in 1953 by G.E. Moore. He talks about an imaginative scenario where one would compare two squares and whether they are the same square or not. Moore concludes that depending on what you describe about the square (e.g. the bounding lines of the square, the length of each side etc) you can at least say that the two squares is the same in quality - they are qualitatively identical. But if the sides of the two squares they are not numerically the same, obviously. Although I find this quite apparent, I kind of helps that you at least can talk about the similarities between two objects who somewhat share an attribute. In this case, its shape. I believe this helps me to better understand that sense-data is very dependent on ones subjective observation. It is a relative term.


Moore even goes to lengths to say that no sense-data perceived by someone is the same as for someone else. It is identical to your spatial relation to that object. For example, if you observe the color of an apple hanging from a tree. The shiny red apple you see glimmering is a unique sense-data perceived by you. Anyone else watching the same tree cannot perceive the apple the same way you do, it is dependent on your viewing angle, your height and so on. I would like to quote Moore to explain this further: ”The sense-given field of vision of each of us, at any
moment, constitutes a private space of that person's own;—no two
points in any two of these spaces, can be related to one another in any
of the ways in which two points in any one of them are related.”


References:
G.E. Moore ”Sense-data - Some Main Problems of Philosophy”, 1953, London
http://selfpace.uconn.edu/class/percep/MooreSenseData.pdf


fredag 8 november 2013

Theme #1 - Pre-reflections

What does Russell mean by "sense data" and why does he introduce this notion?
Sense data is a part of what Russel refers to as things that we as humans register as a sensation. Something that really immerse your senses. For example colors, smells and sound. Those are all three clear and distinct, and different things that are typical for our sense of sight, smell and hearing. Russel clearly points out though that the color (i.e. green) is not a sensation in itself, but a part of the sense-data that is clearly associated with the physical object with that specific attribute.

If I were to give my meaning of sense-data, it is something that can be connected as an attribute to a physical object, giving it some kind of "life", at least in our mind, beyond its apparent name. Sense-data stands in great contrast to the physical objects, or matter as Russel likes to call them. The sense-data makes us become aware of the physical object, but it does not mean that we know the object is there, we just get a sense of it being there. We merely feel its appearance. The objects actual existence is debatable. Russel introduces sense-data to make the point that an objects existence is relative, since the only way for us to believe we know a physical object truly exist is if we can experience the truth about its sense-data.

What is the meaning of the terms "proposition" and "statement of fact"? How does propositions and statement of facts differ from other kinds of verbal expressions?
A proposition is a statement of something that have a possibility of being true. Russel uses the term proposition as a way to differentiate how we relate to different objects. You can propose something that may or may not be true, based on either acquaintance with the object or something that Russel calls "knowledge by description". This is also somewhat what makes it differ from other "verbal expressions" since it says something about truth, or non-truth for that matter, of an object.

So for example if I make a statement saying that "my house have round windows" I know it as a fact of truth. I can say the following about my house "the house with round windows". This is what Russel refers to as "the so-and-so", the the is the imminent truth about what I am describing. It is based on acquaintance. If I on the other hand just have heard about a house with round windows, it is knowledge by description. My "so-and-so" description is now not a truth, it could be, but I'm not acquainted with it so I referred to it as "a so-and-so". It is not a definite description, it's ambiguous.

Russel also underline that for a proposal containing descriptions to be analysed it has to be composed fully of constituents that which we are acquainted with.

In chapter 5 ("Knowledge by Acquaintance and Knowledge by Description") Russell introduces the notion "definite description". What does this notion mean?
A definite description according to Russel is something that can be derived to a specific object. Even if we are not acquainted with it. The description used in chapter 5 to illustrate this was "the man with the iron mask". This description, in contrast to just "a man", is a definite description since it describes "the so-and-so". Even if I personally didn't know who the man with the iron mask was, I know that there is only "one" true man with an iron mask. And I know that Russels idea of the man with the iron mask refers to the same man, a singular and unique entity.

In chapter 13 ("Knowledge, Error and Probable Opinion") and in chapter 14 ("The Limits of Philosophical Knowledge") Russell attacks traditional problems in theory of knowledge (epistemology). What are the main points in Russell's presentation?
Russel first explains that knowledge could be defined as "true belief". Although this becomes problematic when your belief is based on wrong facts. So there have to be a more strict definition than just your beliefs since your beliefs can be based on fallacious process of reasoning.

If we would take the modern way of looking at the definition, not that much (in my opinion) efforts is put in to criticizing the way you base your knowledge on. This being said, Russel clearly wants to make a more fine grained definition of what true knowledge actually is. To approach this, Russel explains different version of what one might think is knowledge. Derivative knowledge are knowledge that are somewhat self-evident and easy for others to accept as a truth. One other type of knowledge that is different from something that are self-evident truths are the intuitive knowledge which has a more gradual degree of trustworthiness. If it turns out that the intuitive knowledge you have is not to be declared as self-evident, it is a probable opinion.

In contrast to this, Russell talks about the concept of philosophical knowledge which are in his words based on a more "metaphysical reasoning". Russell criticize this point of reasoning since it entails that your acquaintance with something does not mean that you have the knowledge of its relations, which this type of thinking is based on.