Sense data is a part of what Russel refers to as things that we as humans register as a sensation. Something that really immerse your senses. For example colors, smells and sound. Those are all three clear and distinct, and different things that are typical for our sense of sight, smell and hearing. Russel clearly points out though that the color (i.e. green) is not a sensation in itself, but a part of the sense-data that is clearly associated with the physical object with that specific attribute.
If I were to give my meaning of sense-data, it is something that can be connected as an attribute to a physical object, giving it some kind of "life", at least in our mind, beyond its apparent name. Sense-data stands in great contrast to the physical objects, or matter as Russel likes to call them. The sense-data makes us become aware of the physical object, but it does not mean that we know the object is there, we just get a sense of it being there. We merely feel its appearance. The objects actual existence is debatable. Russel introduces sense-data to make the point that an objects existence is relative, since the only way for us to believe we know a physical object truly exist is if we can experience the truth about its sense-data.
What is the meaning of the terms "proposition" and "statement of fact"? How does propositions and statement of facts differ from other kinds of verbal expressions?
A proposition is a statement of something that have a possibility of being true. Russel uses the term proposition as a way to differentiate how we relate to different objects. You can propose something that may or may not be true, based on either acquaintance with the object or something that Russel calls "knowledge by description". This is also somewhat what makes it differ from other "verbal expressions" since it says something about truth, or non-truth for that matter, of an object.
So for example if I make a statement saying that "my house have round windows" I know it as a fact of truth. I can say the following about my house "the house with round windows". This is what Russel refers to as "the so-and-so", the the is the imminent truth about what I am describing. It is based on acquaintance. If I on the other hand just have heard about a house with round windows, it is knowledge by description. My "so-and-so" description is now not a truth, it could be, but I'm not acquainted with it so I referred to it as "a so-and-so". It is not a definite description, it's ambiguous.
Russel also underline that for a proposal containing descriptions to be analysed it has to be composed fully of constituents that which we are acquainted with.
In chapter 5 ("Knowledge by Acquaintance and Knowledge by Description") Russell introduces the notion "definite description". What does this notion mean?
A definite description according to Russel is something that can be derived to a specific object. Even if we are not acquainted with it. The description used in chapter 5 to illustrate this was "the man with the iron mask". This description, in contrast to just "a man", is a definite description since it describes "the so-and-so". Even if I personally didn't know who the man with the iron mask was, I know that there is only "one" true man with an iron mask. And I know that Russels idea of the man with the iron mask refers to the same man, a singular and unique entity.
In chapter 13 ("Knowledge, Error and Probable Opinion") and in chapter 14 ("The Limits of Philosophical Knowledge") Russell attacks traditional problems in theory of knowledge (epistemology). What are the main points in Russell's presentation?
Russel first explains that knowledge could be defined as "true belief". Although this becomes problematic when your belief is based on wrong facts. So there have to be a more strict definition than just your beliefs since your beliefs can be based on fallacious process of reasoning.
If we would take the modern way of looking at the definition, not that much (in my opinion) efforts is put in to criticizing the way you base your knowledge on. This being said, Russel clearly wants to make a more fine grained definition of what true knowledge actually is. To approach this, Russel explains different version of what one might think is knowledge. Derivative knowledge are knowledge that are somewhat self-evident and easy for others to accept as a truth. One other type of knowledge that is different from something that are self-evident truths are the intuitive knowledge which has a more gradual degree of trustworthiness. If it turns out that the intuitive knowledge you have is not to be declared as self-evident, it is a probable opinion.
In contrast to this, Russell talks about the concept of philosophical knowledge which are in his words based on a more "metaphysical reasoning". Russell criticize this point of reasoning since it entails that your acquaintance with something does not mean that you have the knowledge of its relations, which this type of thinking is based on.
If I were to give my meaning of sense-data, it is something that can be connected as an attribute to a physical object, giving it some kind of "life", at least in our mind, beyond its apparent name. Sense-data stands in great contrast to the physical objects, or matter as Russel likes to call them. The sense-data makes us become aware of the physical object, but it does not mean that we know the object is there, we just get a sense of it being there. We merely feel its appearance. The objects actual existence is debatable. Russel introduces sense-data to make the point that an objects existence is relative, since the only way for us to believe we know a physical object truly exist is if we can experience the truth about its sense-data.
What is the meaning of the terms "proposition" and "statement of fact"? How does propositions and statement of facts differ from other kinds of verbal expressions?
A proposition is a statement of something that have a possibility of being true. Russel uses the term proposition as a way to differentiate how we relate to different objects. You can propose something that may or may not be true, based on either acquaintance with the object or something that Russel calls "knowledge by description". This is also somewhat what makes it differ from other "verbal expressions" since it says something about truth, or non-truth for that matter, of an object.
So for example if I make a statement saying that "my house have round windows" I know it as a fact of truth. I can say the following about my house "the house with round windows". This is what Russel refers to as "the so-and-so", the the is the imminent truth about what I am describing. It is based on acquaintance. If I on the other hand just have heard about a house with round windows, it is knowledge by description. My "so-and-so" description is now not a truth, it could be, but I'm not acquainted with it so I referred to it as "a so-and-so". It is not a definite description, it's ambiguous.
Russel also underline that for a proposal containing descriptions to be analysed it has to be composed fully of constituents that which we are acquainted with.
In chapter 5 ("Knowledge by Acquaintance and Knowledge by Description") Russell introduces the notion "definite description". What does this notion mean?
A definite description according to Russel is something that can be derived to a specific object. Even if we are not acquainted with it. The description used in chapter 5 to illustrate this was "the man with the iron mask". This description, in contrast to just "a man", is a definite description since it describes "the so-and-so". Even if I personally didn't know who the man with the iron mask was, I know that there is only "one" true man with an iron mask. And I know that Russels idea of the man with the iron mask refers to the same man, a singular and unique entity.
In chapter 13 ("Knowledge, Error and Probable Opinion") and in chapter 14 ("The Limits of Philosophical Knowledge") Russell attacks traditional problems in theory of knowledge (epistemology). What are the main points in Russell's presentation?
Russel first explains that knowledge could be defined as "true belief". Although this becomes problematic when your belief is based on wrong facts. So there have to be a more strict definition than just your beliefs since your beliefs can be based on fallacious process of reasoning.
If we would take the modern way of looking at the definition, not that much (in my opinion) efforts is put in to criticizing the way you base your knowledge on. This being said, Russel clearly wants to make a more fine grained definition of what true knowledge actually is. To approach this, Russel explains different version of what one might think is knowledge. Derivative knowledge are knowledge that are somewhat self-evident and easy for others to accept as a truth. One other type of knowledge that is different from something that are self-evident truths are the intuitive knowledge which has a more gradual degree of trustworthiness. If it turns out that the intuitive knowledge you have is not to be declared as self-evident, it is a probable opinion.
In contrast to this, Russell talks about the concept of philosophical knowledge which are in his words based on a more "metaphysical reasoning". Russell criticize this point of reasoning since it entails that your acquaintance with something does not mean that you have the knowledge of its relations, which this type of thinking is based on.
Hi Mårten! I enjoyed reading your blogpost and I think you clearly understood the concept of sense-data. When you mentioned that "sense-data, it is something that can be connected as an attribute to a physical object, giving it some kind of 'life' " I started reasoning if objects can contain life? Thinking about that objects consist of molecules, atoms or the chemical element carbon, which is the basic compound of "life forms", you might made a good point there!
SvaraRaderaHi! I want to comment about how you stated that sense-data is like an attribute that is connected to a physical object, and how we are aware of the object but it doesn't mean it's actually there.
SvaraRaderaI had previously just written another comment on someone else's blog (http://tmmlp2013.blogspot.se/2013/11/theme-1-theory-of-science.html) about this. I started thinking about how Russell is calling this object as "physical". You explained the sense-data as attributes, which usually are adjectives in this case, right? But isn't the word "physical" an adjective, and thus also should be an attribute? How come that we are so certain about the object being "physical" but unsure about any other attribute, and yet at the same time unsure whether this object actually exists? I had come up with the idea that this object should in fact be called "unidentified object"! What do you think?c